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1 Introduction
On 26 January 2021, while announcing that the country had reached the mark of 
100,000 deaths within 28 days of COVID-19, UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson 
said that he took “full responsibility for everything that the Government has done” 
as part of British efforts to tackle the pandemic. The force of this statement was 
undermined, however, by what followed:
What I can tell you is that we truly did everything we could, and continue to 
do everything that we can, to minimise loss of life and to minimise suffering... 
[1]
Taking these sentiments together, it was hard to avoid the conclusion that the gov-
ernment took responsibility only for doing everything right. Such an admission of 
responsibility, accommodating no admission of error or wrongdoing, is not really 
about responsibility at all. Indeed, the UK’s pandemic response has been marked 
from its earliest days by a shifting of focus from institutional responsibility to per-
sonal responsibility for individual UK residents [2].
This paper explores the relationship between these two sites of responsibility—
the institutional and the personal—in the context of the sort of pandemic that is 
ongoing as we write. Section 2 offers some initial definitions and discussions of key 
terms. Section 3 outlines how these two ideas interact in principle during such emer-
gencies. Section 4 turns to the ‘non-ideal’ implications for personal responsibility of 
failures of institutional responsibility. While our focus is on the specific context with 
which we are most familiar, the UK governmental approach, where appropriate we 
also include examples from other states.
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2  Personal and Institutional Responsibility
Much discussion of responsibility in healthcare focuses on its potential role as 
a distributive criterion, e.g., whether it is right to treat patients differently when 
their health needs are due to their own choices. In a pandemic, certain ways of 
understanding this idea seem clearly ruled out. For instance, some might think 
that those who knowingly  ignore pandemic guidelines, and who become ill, 
should not have access to treatment. Yet in a pandemic, a policy of refusing to 
treat people who are responsible for their condition would need to reckon with 
what happens to those infected with the SARS-CoV-2 virus who are not admitted 
to hospital. If they must be cared for by loved ones, this risks infection of non-
culpable individuals. Thus, even ignoring powerful moral arguments against such 
a policy [3, 4], there are public protection grounds to reject it during a pandemic.
Even policies which are less extreme, such as prioritising access to critical 
care beds or ventilators, face pragmatic challenges. For instance, Davies and 
Savulescu [5] suggest that although there are grounds for ignoring responsibility 
when responsibility-sensitivity will make a patient very badly off, when we face a 
choice between patients who will both become badly off if not treated, and when 
resources are scarce, it may be legitimate to consider responsibility again. Yet 
the argument explicitly excludes emergencies, primarily because attempting to 
judge responsibility in an emergency would inevitably fall to medical staff, often 
resulting in worse outcomes for both culpable and non-culpable patients. Another 
important consideration raised by the current COVID pandemic is that medical 
staff are emotionally, physically and mentally overwhelmed. It would be immoral 
to ask them to make difficult judgements of responsibility on top of their already 
onerous workload. Thus, our discussion of responsibility has a different focus.
We are all affected by decisions of international bodies such as the World 
Health Organization and United Nations, and by the decisions of other countries. 
A pandemic is an international issue which requires global cooperation. Yet as 
individuals we are also affected by the decisions of our own national and regional 
institutions, and it is on these latter levels that we focus. Pandemics give rise to 
collective responsibilities which can be conceptually divided up in various ways. 
One important division is between the ‘personal responsibility’ of individuals, 
and the ‘institutional responsibility’ of bodies such as national and regional gov-
ernment, advisory bodies such as the UK’s Scientific Advisory Group for Emer-
gencies (SAGE) and social bodies such as the National Health Service (NHS) 
and police forces. Our primary focus is on government and its advisors, but we 
also discuss other institutions where relevant. We do not suggest that institutional 
responsibility for an issue fully precludes personal responsibility. In a democracy, 
some elements of institutional responsibility are, at least indirectly, in our collec-
tive hands [6, 7], and each of us may have responsibilities to vote and advocate in 
ways that support better institutional responses. But at the more immediate stage, 
when a problem such as COVID confronts us, this kind of control that citizens 
have over their governments is far more limited.
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Our interest is in how these two levels of responsibility interact. As already 
noted, UK government rhetoric has largely focused—the Prime Minister’s 26 Jan-
uary claim notwithstanding—on personal responsibility. For instance, in the brief 
period before reversing planned relaxations of lockdown rules over Christmas 
2020, then-Health Secretary Matt Hancock made a speech in Parliament insist-
ing that the public should take “personal responsibility” [8] for behaving in ways 
that the government had implicitly endorsed by relaxing restrictions but would 
soon go on to prohibit again [9]. In May 2020, the Prime Minister’s focus was 
not on governmental responsibility, but on “good, solid British common sense” 
[10]. More recently, Hancock blamed vaccine hesitancy for upsurges in cases of 
the Delta variant in various areas of the country [11] but did not acknowledge the 
possible role of a decision not to immediately put India on the UK’s ‘red list’ for 
quarantine rules [12].
One important distinction is between retrospective and prospective claims of 
responsibility. Prospective claims focus on, as Cane [13, p. 281] puts it, questions 
such as “what are our responsibilities?”. For instance, the claim that ‘we must all 
work together to beat this virus’ is a prospective claim of collective national respon-
sibility. Retrospective responsibility concerns the apportionment of responsibility 
for past failures or successes. Prospective responsibility to tackle a particular issue 
may be assigned for various reasons. One is the fact that it is a formal part of an offi-
cial role [13, 14, pp. 212–214, 15]; for instance, perhaps it is constitutive of national 
government that it has obligations to coordinate a national emergency response. 
As Cane [13, p. 286] notes, role responsibility is particularly interesting in a politi-
cal context because a person can be held liable, due to their role, for events or the 
actions of others over which they had no control.
Another important reason is that a particular individual or institution is best 
placed to address an issue. Thus, one might think that some kinds of personal behav-
iour are impossible for government to monitor en masse, and are thus partly matters 
of personal responsibility. Finally, prospective responsibility to deal with an issue 
may come from causal contribution to it, subject to conditions of control and knowl-
edge [16]. Thus, government might be responsible for addressing certain outcomes 
if its own policies contributed to them.
Each of these reasons may be relevant to retrospective responsibility. As we 
understand it, retrospective responsibility concerns attributions of fault or credit for 
situations on the basis of an earlier, prospective responsibility. If someone fails to 
tackle an issue for which they have role, capacity or causal responsibility, they may 
be retrospectively responsible for this failure.
Our primary interest is in prospective responsibility, particularly exploring how 
responsibilities should be understood at the outset of the next pandemic, should it 
occur. But this is most usefully done, we think, by considering the question of ret-
rospective responsibility in the current pandemic. We use lessons from the ongoing 
COVID-19 pandemic to draw conclusions on this issue. The idea of retrospective 
responsibility is also important because one form of institutional responsibility for 
which we argue is that institutions must acknowledge negative retrospective respon-
sibility rather than attempting to hide it. One important form of institutional respon-
sibility is taking ownership of past failures.
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A final caveat is necessary regarding ‘institutional responsibility’. There are 
important questions about how we should understand the idea that institutions or 
other corporate bodies, which are made up of a multitude of individuals and the 
interactions between them, should be understood [17]. We side-step these questions, 
and in particular the issue of whether institutional responsibility is reducible to the 
responsibilities of individual members or representatives, or whether we can non-
reductively hold institutions themselves responsible. That the former possibility is a 
live option explains our decision to contrast institutional with ‘personal’, rather than 
‘individual’ responsibility.
3  Balancing Responsibilities in a Pandemic
A prominent feature of the UK government’s COVID response has been a reli-
ance on slogans, particularly the instruction first adopted in March 2020 [18], and 
repeated intermittently, to:
Stay at Home. Protect the NHS. Save Lives.
Thus, the instruction for people to avoid contact with one another as far as possible 
was framed as a personal and collective responsibility for the public. This had two 
linked goals: protect a highly trusted [19, 20] national institution; and reduce avoid-
able deaths and serious illness. Other countries’ messaging had a similar emphasis 
on personal responsibility [21, 22, p. 1, 23], including some of those who appear to 
have tackled the pandemic more effectively [24]. At least in the UK, the same can-
not be said for institutional responsibility. As well as Johnson’s rhetoric noted above, 
there are many examples of government or other institutions downplaying institu-
tional responsibility, and of failing to meet key institutional responsibilities, some of 
which we discuss in more detail below [10, 25–29].
This section sets out our view of how various facets of pandemics are subjects 
of institutional and personal responsibility. A straightforward approach would be to 
divide up spheres of influence between the personal and the institutional. This sec-
tion begins this task, but then Section 4 notes two ways in which personal and insti-
tutional responsibility are interrelated. In what follows, we consider mistakes made 
during the COVID pandemic with a view to establishing prospective responsibilities 
for the future.
3.1  Institutional Pandemic Responsibilities
It is not easy to make the right choices in a novel pandemic. The earliest months 
of COVID provide a case in point: governments were forced to, as Dutch leader 
Mark Rutte put it, “mak[e] 100% of the decisions with less than 50% of the informa-
tion” [30, p. 190]. In any unfamiliar emergency, it would be unreasonable to expect 
institutions to get everything right [31]. However, this does not preclude three broad 
types of institutional responsibility. First, while some mistakes are understand-
able early on, this does not extend to all kinds of error. While no institution can 
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be criticized for failing to perfect their pandemic response immediately, institutions 
which fail to take lessons from both other countries’ decisions and their own past 
mistakes are culpable. Institutions thus have a responsibility to properly prepare for 
pandemics. Second, even if mistakes are inevitable, the outcomes of those errors 
may be exacerbated by failures to properly respond. Thus, institutions have a respon-
sibility to identify mistakes and change course. Finally, for both culpable and non-
culpable mistakes, there is a separate institutional responsibility of honest and effec-
tive communication.
The first set of institutional responsibilities relate to pandemic preparedness. 
Although no pandemic is singularly predictable, what is predictable is the risk of 
serious pandemics [32]. The COVID pandemic was pre-empted by recent outbreaks 
of Ebola, bird flu and swine flu. Government and health institutions have responsi-
bilities to prepare for such eventualities by having detailed pandemic plans, adapt-
able to a variety of situations; one criticism of the UK government’s early COVID 
response was that it was modelled too closely, and for too long, on preparations for 
an influenza pandemic [33, 34], and involved a general failure to adapt preventive 
measures quickly enough, leading to a situation where, as Cairney [35, p. 18] puts it 
“In comparison with many countries, UK government ministers seemed reluctant to 
enforce state quarantine measures”. Moreover, there is evidence that the UK govern-
ment did engage in pandemic preparedness exercises, but then largely ignored the 
results [36, p. 503].
Responsibilities of pandemic planning include having appropriate supplies of 
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) for healthcare and other frontline workers. 
They also require government institutions to ensure that key social services, such 
as the health service and police, are not operating under severe pressures that could 
turn into disasters in a pandemic. It is worth noting when it comes to these latter two 
responsibilities that they cover not only the immediate resources required for health-
care professionals and institutions, but also critically reflecting on broader strategies 
and goals of government. For instance, Sanders [37, p. 368] notes that in the years 
leading up to COVID, “Emergency stockpiles of PPE had severely dwindled and 
gone out of date after becoming a low priority in the years of austerity cuts”. Simi-
larly, Oliver [38, p. 1], focusing on care home deaths, suggests that, “Even before 
the pandemic, [people] had repeatedly highlighted the crisis in care home capacity, 
funding, financial viability, and inconsistent support from overstretched local NHS 
services”, noting the responsibility not only of government but of other social insti-
tutions such as the press for ignoring this situation (see also [39, p. 33]). This high-
lights the institutional responsibility to consider whether politically attractive poli-
cies such as spending cuts might impact core areas of responsibility.
This links directly to the implication with which we began this section, that it 
is the responsibility of individual members of the UK public to ‘protect’ the NHS. 
Whether or not this is accurate in some sense, it obscures the question of why the 
health service needed so much protection. A public health sector is primarily the 
responsibility of government, and of sector managers. Thus, as we discuss in more 
detail in Section 4, it may be accurate to say that the public have a responsibility 
to ‘protect the NHS’; but this responsibility is situated within broader institutional 
responsibilities.
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Perhaps less obvious—at least, it would not have occurred to us prior to this pan-
demic—is the question of whether other institutions should also have pandemic 
preparedness plans. COVID-19 has been one of the most significant upheavals to 
working life that wealthy countries such as the UK have seen in decades, probably 
since the Second World War. Many organisations and individuals responded in hap-
hazard ways. For instance, the university sector has been criticized for insisting on a 
‘business as usual approach’ [40] and abandoning students [41], though this must be 
seen in a context of many individuals doing their best in difficult circumstances. One 
possibility is that many educational institutions are locked into particular models of 
teaching and learning, perhaps for understandable reasons, which made the transi-
tion more difficult than it needed to be. It may be that our new knowledge of the pos-
sibility of dramatic and sudden change means there is now a responsibility to engage 
in ‘future-proofing’ against similar disruptions in years to come.
Pandemic preparedness, by its nature, is an institutional responsibility that occurs 
before any emergency has begun. We now turn to institutional responsibilities that 
operate in the ‘moving present’ of an ongoing pandemic. Governmental institutions 
have various responsibilities to take measures to combat the spread and impact of 
disease, as well as the effects of those measures. Many of these responsibilities were 
undertaken by the UK government and its advisors during COVID. State institutions 
funded research into treatments aimed at alleviating symptoms and reducing deaths 
[42], and into vaccinations [43], and later took on the complex task of administer-
ing those vaccinations. A ‘test and trace’ system was established, and a border con-
trol scheme instituted which required quarantine on entering the country, both with 
the aim of catching cases before others were infected. Government sourced PPE 
for healthcare and other frontline workers, and developed and disseminated guid-
ance and legal frameworks designed to help direct individual behaviours in ways 
most beneficial to controlling the spread of the virus. Meanwhile, the Treasury also 
embarked on a scheme of financial support to meet the severe costs incurred by 
businesses which were forced to shut during the worst periods of the virus [44]. 
The government engaged in some financial contributions towards the provision of 
vaccinations to poorer countries through the COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access 
(COVAX) initiative [45], though at the time of writing there are still extreme ine-
qualities in levels of vaccination between wealthy and poorer countries. Many of 
these undertakings required coordination with other governments and international 
bodies. These are, we suggest, the core institutional responsibilities of government 
during a pandemic.
Anyone who lived in the UK during 2020 will be struck by two things about 
the preceding paragraph. First, it is all technically true. Second, if your only infor-
mation about the country’s pandemic response was that paragraph, you would be 
poorly informed. While some elements of the government’s response have been 
praised [31, pp. 11–19], much has come under considerable criticism. To take 
just a few examples, the government’s advice was repeatedly criticized for being 
unclear and, at times, self-contradictory [46], while the behaviour of individual 
people at the top of government was sometimes at odds with the official line, 
which some research suggested filtered down to reduced public compliance [47], 
and which came on top of other inconsistencies or confusions in messaging [48, 
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p. 530]. Logistical decisions were criticized for being overly centralized, often 
ignoring existing local networks [25, 48, pp. 524–525] and relying on targets that 
served political rather than public health goals [31, p. 4]. The implementation of 
quarantine for international travelers did occur, but only 12 months after the start 
of the pandemic, and then only inconsistently [36, p. 504]. Financial support was 
patchy, with gaps for the newly self-employed and considerable losses to fraud, 
while there was reluctance to provide meaningful support for those who were 
supposed to self-isolate, even where for many of those with insecure contracts, 
unsympathetic bosses, or no sick pay, taking two weeks off work will have been a 
daunting demand [35].
This brings us to our third category of institutional responsibility. Inevitably, 
discussing this in the present, practical context highlights the messiness beneath 
the conceptually neat distinction we made above between prospective and retro-
spective responsibility. In the middle of an ongoing crisis, a single issue may be 
the subject of both past choices and forward-looking decisions. These two issues 
are linked; it is more difficult (though not impossible) to change course on a par-
ticular issue if there is no acknowledgement of past error. Attempts to do so may 
result in public confusion and scepticism. In contrast, highlighting where things 
have previously gone wrong can provide a clear rationale for changes that can be 
understandable by those subject to them.
One partial success in this regard is Singapore. In September 2020, Prime 
Minister Lee Hsien Loong acknowledged that the country had made mistakes in 
its initial approach, including:
• Not encouraging mask use early enough;
• Not addressing issues with workers living in dormitories; and
• Not quarantining all returners from abroad and not testing them before they 
left quarantine.
Some of these issues (masks, quarantine) were understandable, and down to inter-
national uncertainty about the extent of asymptomatic transmission [49]. But the 
dormitory issue was predictable—all communal living situations are a risk. Sin-
gapore subsequently modified these policies; but Lee has admitted the error, add-
ing that “in the fog of war, it is not possible always to make the perfect decisions” 
[50]. We do not suggest that Singapore’s COVID response has been perfect since 
then [51], but that this highlights the way in which governments and other insti-
tutions can reasonably acknowledge their failures of responsibility, and publicly 
identify ways to fix them in the future. In contrast, while the UK government has 
occasionally, and under pressure, admitted mistakes [52], this has come within 
the much broader context of deflection.
Regardless of one’s judgement of how particular governments have performed, 
we suggest that institutions have a responsibility to be up front about what they 
have got wrong. As Intisar Chowdhury, son of an NHS doctor who warned of 
PPE shortages before dying of COVID, put it during a radio phone-in involving 
Hancock:
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The public is not expecting the government to handle this perfectly. We just 
want you to openly acknowledge there have been mistakes in handling this 
virus. [53]
Chowdhury makes a strong case for pragmatic reasons to acknowledge error: the 
general public will be aware of errors, inconsistencies, and changes in advice. The 
(perceived) legitimacy of rules and advice depends on clear admission of previous 
mistakes, and explanations of how such mistakes are being avoided. There are also 
moral reasons [54, p. 7]. In a democratic society, citizens have a right to transparent 
public institutions in all but exceptional cases in order to exercise their democratic 
rights. Where institutional errors lead to avoidable death and suffering, there is an 
independent moral requirement based in respect for those who have suffered for 
institutions to acknowledge their retrospective responsibility for decisions that led 
to such harms. This is a key area where the UK government has come under criti-
cism [37, p. 356]. While Johnson has promised an inquiry, this commitment was not 
made until May 2021, and proceedings will not begin until Spring 2022 [55].
As well as having a responsibility to admit what has gone wrong, public-facing 
institutions also have a responsibility (accepted rather more readily) to acknowledge 
what has gone right. Again, there are also pragmatic reasons—it is important for 
people to recognise when progress is made—and moral reasons in that the require-
ment of honesty cuts both ways. But this more welcome responsibility for institu-
tions to communicate good news suggests a further pragmatic reason to be honest 
about past errors: when institutions imply they have made no mistakes, it is harder 
for individual citizens to distinguish genuine successes. Attempts to present an 
entirely positive story about institutional responsibility may create general cynicism 
about all institutional claims.
3.2  Personal Responsibility and Its Limits
Just as there are issues during a pandemic for which institutions most properly take 
responsibility, so too are there issues for which personal responsibility is the more 
appropriate focus. This section focuses primarily on individuals who do not have 
any additional special roles during a pandemic; that is, individuals qua members 
of the public. However, Section 4 briefly touches on whether medical professionals 
have a responsibility to work in situations where they lack adequate protection.
There is some evidence that the UK public have increasingly accepted the role of 
personal responsibility as the pandemic progresses [47], though this does not mean 
they do not also hold institutions responsible [56]. However, there is also evidence 
that most people believe their individual compliance with rules is above average [57, 
p. 3].
In the absence of extreme levels of coercion, individuals must take responsibil-
ity for following reasonable and well-communicated guidance to spreading dis-
ease. As Timmerman [54, p. 2] puts it, a pandemic “requires a collective effort that 
cannot succeed by governmental actions alone and requires the active cooperation 
of the general population”. In the case of COVID, the evidence suggests that the 
primary method of infection spread is via air droplets; and so, individuals have a 
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responsibility to avoid sharing unventilated spaces with others where possible, and 
to wear masks and keep a reasonable distance when this is unavoidable [39, p. 38]. 
There is also a responsibility to self-isolate if you have evidence that you have con-
tracted the SARS COV-2 virus, and to be honest in dealing with public health offi-
cials trying to track the spread of disease.
We also suggest that, if an effective vaccine is available, many individuals have 
a moral responsibility to get vaccinated (see also [58, pp. 136–137]). The rationale 
for this is the same as for other preventive measures. For most of us, the risks of vac-
cination are extremely low. As is the case with COVID, effective vaccines reduce 
one’s own likelihood of becoming ill, and thus further stretching the resources of 
health services. The effect on transmission, and thus the risk of harming others, is 
still a subject of research in the case of COVID, but also seems likely to be sig-
nificant [59]. Insisting on this moral responsibility does not equate to claiming that 
government may legally enforce vaccination. While Savulescu [60] argues in favour 
of mandatory vaccination in some cases, we do not take a position on this issue in 
this paper.
Even focusing on moral rather than legal responsibility, these claims need quali-
fication. In philosophical discussion, moral responsibility is tied closely to praise 
and blame; if one fails one’s responsibilities, one is thereby blameworthy (even if it 
would be counterproductive to actually express blame). Yet it is important to recog-
nize the varying degrees of ease with which people can understand and take on the 
personal responsibilities we set out above. Recall that on the standard philosophical 
view responsibility requires both control and knowledge. Knowing about and fulfill-
ing one’s responsibilities may be easy for some, but difficult for others. For instance, 
the ease with which people can self-isolate upon finding they have symptoms 
depends on, inter alia, their financial stability [23, 61, 62]. The UK government 
offered limited financial support of £500, though only from September 2020 [63], to 
a subset of self-isolators, but low-paid individuals who lack benefits such as sick pay 
will be left significantly vulnerable if they must miss work for an extended period.
Turn now to the knowledge condition on responsibility. According to this con-
dition, you must be capable of reasonably anticipating the effects of your behav-
iour to be responsible for those effects. As the UK’s COVID vaccination program 
moves forward with a significant level of success, many have raised worries about 
the comparatively low level of vaccination among individuals from some ethnic 
groups. This may be partly attributed to issues that are outside of individual control, 
but some have suggested that there is also a higher degree of ‘vaccine hesitancy’ in 
some communities. Vaccine hesitancy does not involve outright opposition to vac-
cination, but rather may stem from various uncertainties around the speed of devel-
opment, mistrust of authorities and institutions that may not have served members 
of one’s ethnic or racial group well, or exposure to misinformation. While individu-
als have personal responsibilities to consider information critically, Razai et al. [64] 
note that it is also important to acknowledge the legitimate distrust that some have in 
medical and other institutions due to personal experiences of discrimination, knowl-
edge about under-representation in medical trials, or of past unethical research (see 
also [54, p. 8]). It is important to note that these various experiences ground rea-
sonable doubts about vaccinations, which may be overcome in many cases through 
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respectful engagement with people’s concerns. If a person’s hesitancy over vaccina-
tion is based on such concerns, then in many such cases those individuals will not 
be responsible for a failure to get vaccinated as soon as possible. But this does not 
extend to just any refusal to be vaccinated, such as those refusals based on wild 
conspiracy theories. Such beliefs are not reasonable, and so those who believe them 
still meet the knowledge condition, in that they have no good reason for false beliefs 
about their personal responsibilities.
We also suggest that individuals have personal responsibilities during a pandemic 
not only to worry about what is legal, but what is sensible and ethical. Individu-
als have obligations to evaluate the situation independently and come to their own 
conclusion about whether a legally sanctioned activity is ethically permissible. This 
is not always easy; in the context of rapidly changing rules and complex scientific 
advice, it is understandable that some might fall back on legal permissibility. Yet 
even the UK government advocated against this at some points. For instance, the 
government reversed their long-advertised stance that restrictions would be relaxed 
for Christmas shortly before the celebration, a policy which had come under consid-
erable criticism [26]. This led to scenes at London’s St Pancras station where crowds 
rushed to get trains to see family while it was still legal to leave the capital [65]. 
More generally, the government’s policy on new restrictions was largely to announce 
them several days in advance. Although more could have been done to communicate 
the difference between legal restrictions and sensible behaviour, it is not beyond the 
ability of most people to work out that if something is sufficiently risky to warrant 
legal restrictions in three days’ time, it is probably sufficiently risky to avoid it even 
before the law changes. Indeed, Newton [36, p. 510] notes, that the UK public was 
largely “a low trust and sceptical population socially isolating and distancing itself, 
sometimes before the government told them to and often continuing to do so after 
the rules were eased”.
A final issue takes us in the opposite direction: is it sometimes permissible to be 
less cautious than advised or legally required? Of course, some people regard the 
pandemic as a hoax, and thus believe all measures to be unjustified. Since the pan-
demic is clearly not a hoax, much of their behaviour was itself a violation of respon-
sibilities. There are two more interesting types of case. First, some may regard gov-
ernment rules as generally sensible but justifiably believe themselves to be a valid 
exception to individual rules. For instance, during periods when it was illegal (with 
some exceptions) to visit others at home, two family groups might have self-isolated 
carefully for several weeks, and then reasonably believed limited contact to be safe. 
Second, and relatedly, some people may regard the general set of laws as justified 
but reject particular rules. For instance, there were several periods in the UK’s fre-
quently changing regulations when it was illegal to meet a friend for a walk outside, 
even though the risks of spreading the virus outside, in small groups, are widely 
agreed to be low [66].
However, even where the standard reasons to follow the rules are lacking there 
are still considerations supporting some personal responsibility to follow the law. 
First, even if a particular individual could be certain they posed no risk of infection, 
there is no easy way to communicate this to others, and seeing apparent violations 
by others may weaken people’s motivation to comply themselves. Second, we are 
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often motivated to deliberate in self-serving ways, and to assess risk on the basis of 
what we would like to be true. Still, there may be cases where following the rules 
strictly might itself cause considerable harm. Thus, there is no simple account of 
people’s personal responsibilities around rule-following. While there are some rea-
sons to stick to the rules even when one is reasonably confident that one will not 
cause harm by failing to do so, the costs of compliance are also relevant.
4  The Institutional and the Personal
We have so far suggested that there are some issues that arise in pandemics which 
can properly be seen as institutional responsibilities, and others which are more 
appropriately seen as personal responsibilities. This section acknowledges a com-
plexity to this division: personal responsibilities are in many ways shaped by the 
institutional response. Indeed, we argue that institutional responsibility is prior to 
personal responsibility in a pandemic.
This shaping occurs in two ways. First, the most appropriate way to think about 
personal responsibilities must presume an adequate institutional response. In 
other words, many personal pandemic responsibilities apply only if they are situ-
ated within a system of effective institutional responsibility. Second, however, the 
absence of proper institutional responsibility does not automatically obviate per-
sonal responsibility. Rather, in some cases of institutional failure there are remedial 
responsibilities which fall on the rest of us as individuals.
4.1  How Institutional Responsibility Structures Personal Responsibility 
in a Pandemic
Response to a pandemic is a collective action problem. Each individual’s behaviour 
(e.g., seeing friends in a park) may contribute little to the outcome but collectively 
such behaviours may have massive costs. While social norms play a part in solving 
the tragedy of the commons [67], institutional responses are important in structuring 
those norms and going further to create direct incentives and disincentives. In some 
cases, laws may be required to restrict behaviour. Such coercive measures are justi-
fied when they impose small costs for large collective gains [68, 69].
We noted in Section 3 that it is important when thinking about personal pandemic 
responsibilities to acknowledge that various responsible behaviours may be difficult 
to perform for some. Such difficulties do not occur randomly; they are social phe-
nomena structured by institutional responses. The degree to which institutions meet 
their responsibilities can shape the ability of individuals to meet their responsibili-
ties. At the extreme, institutional failures may undermine personal responsibilities 
by affecting either individuals’ ability to carry out relevant actions, or knowledge of 
what to do.
One clear example of an effect on ability concerns government financial support 
for self-isolation, mentioned above. Consider what happens if governments fail to 
provide adequate financial support for individuals who need to self-isolate. In the 
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UK and elsewhere, many businesses closed, and their staff were placed on ‘fur-
lough’. But not all workers were eligible for furlough, e.g., because their workplaces 
stayed open. Among that group, some were employed on ‘zero hour’ contracts that 
do not include sick pay, and which require them to accept the shifts they are given or 
risk losing future employment.
Individuals in this position may disagree with an instruction to come into work 
when unwell; but for those who have no power to challenge company policy, and no 
alternative source of income, there may be little choice. As we note above, the UK 
government only introduced a support payment for those on low incomes six months 
into the pandemic, and then it was only £500 for the whole period of self-isolation. 
In one sense, this is a straightforward example of our earlier point: self-isolating 
is more difficult for those in precarious economic circumstances. But it is also an 
example of how institutional decisions may impact personal responsibilities. By ren-
dering workers financially unable to self-isolate or avoid interpersonal contact gov-
ernments, and individual businesses, may change those workers’ responsibilities.
A related effect can be seen in a narrower healthcare setting. In the UK, the NHS 
has an institutional responsibility to look after those who fall ill during a pandemic. 
This gives rise to many instances of personal responsibility on the part of individ-
ual doctors, nurses, and other healthcare and support professionals. Such personal 
responsibilities are, arguably, a constitutive part of the professional role such indi-
viduals inhabit. Yet these responsibilities are not unconditional. One important dif-
ference to the usual caregiving role in a pandemic is the increased personal risk 
which healthcare and other frontline workers face; for instance, Amnesty Interna-
tional [70] have found that at least 17,000 healthcare workers have died of COVID 
worldwide, while research has suggested that UK healthcare workers at at much 
greater risk of ‘severe’ reactions [71]. We have already mentioned issues around the 
government’s procurement of PPE, which included the purchase of substandard pro-
tective equipment. In line with Schüklenk  [72], we suggest that healthcare work-
ers’ caregiving responsibilities are conditional on the government and institutional 
NHS meeting their responsibilities to adequately protect workers (see also [39, p. 
68]). Like other forms of moral obligation, personal responsibility for behaving in a 
particular way is subject to a ‘demandingness’ condition [73], where one cannot be 
expected to fulfil what would otherwise be a responsibility if the costs of doing so 
are too great.
Additionally, where there are inadequate social measures in place to enable peo-
ple to comply with personal responsibilities, a rhetorical insistence on such personal 
responsibility is unethical. We have outlined above how the UK government’s advice 
to the public was criticized for being unclear and confusing, and how some govern-
ment policies themselves may have worsened the pandemic [29], a view apparently 
shared by many senior figures in government [74]. In part, this seems to have been 
due to a lack of clarity within government about who was ultimately responsible 
for certain decisions [31, p. 28]. Yet this did not stop senior figures and high-profile 
institutions from pushing the message that it was a failure of personal responsibility 
by the public that was to blame for further surges in infections [8]. Certainly, there 
will be individuals – perhaps many – who would have ignored even clear advice. 
But whereas it is reasonable to insist on a combination of institutional and personal 
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responsibility, it is unethical for those at the head of institutions to focus entirely on 
purported failures of personal responsibility, and to refuse to acknowledge failures 
of institutional responsibility.
We suggest that a better way for institutions to frame the situation in a pandemic 
may be to focus on the idea of shared responsibility, or a deal between institu-
tions and individuals. It is perhaps natural for those in charge (whether elected or 
appointed) to want to emphasise successes and minimise failures, and thus easy to 
focus instead on what the public must do. An alternative framing is the one we have 
suggested, where institutional responsibilities are clearly set out as providing the 
conditions to enable people to act in responsible ways at a personal level. In many 
cases, it is only then that government can reasonably hold individuals accountable.
It is worth briefly explicating how we understand the idea of ‘shared’ responsibil-
ity, and in particular how it differs from nearby ideas such as ‘collective’ responsi-
bility, and the concept we have already used of ‘institutional’ responsibility.1
Following Smiley [17], we understand the idea of collective responsibility as tak-
ing a stance on an issue we explicitly sideline above, namely the question of whether 
groups or collectives can be understood as moral agents, by locating “the source 
of moral responsibility in the collective actions taken by these groups understood 
as collectives”. The notion of shared responsibility aims not to take a stance on this 
issue; thus, ‘the government’, ‘the state’ and ‘the public’ may or may not be irreduc-
ible collectives.
Also crucial to our idea of shared responsibility in this context is the view that, 
although ultimate responsibility for an outcome is shared among relevant parties, 
there are clearly distinguished roles for each. Responsibility for mitigating pandem-
ics is shared by (individual members of) the public and (individuals in positions of 
power within) institutions; but as we have described it, there is a clear allocation of 
responsibilities contributing to that shared goal.
Finally, we can distinguish shared responsibility from ‘institutional’ responsibil-
ity by noting that in the case under discussion, one of the major groups involved (the 
public) is not an institution. While shared responsibility as we have defined it might 
well operate at both an intra-institutional and inter-institutional level, it ranges more 
broadly than that because it can also encompass (as it does in the case we focus 
on) responsibility that is shared between institutional and non-institutional actors, or 
indeed in situations where no institutions are directly involved.
Turn now to the potential effect of institutional responsibility failures on individ-
uals’ knowledge. A key example of this in the context of the UK’s COVID response 
is handwashing. Early in the pandemic, the mechanisms by which the SARS CoV-2 
virus spread were, understandably, poorly understood. Early public health advice 
relied heavily on knowledge about the spread of influenza, and so focused on trans-
mission by touching infected surfaces, and thus on hand-washing and other forms 
of hygiene. We now know that SARS CoV-2 is extremely unlikely to be spread this 
way, and that the far greater risk is from air droplets. Yet publicly available advice 
was slow to change and, at the time of writing in June 2021, still places key measures 
1 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pushing us to clarify here.
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such as ventilation far below less important measures such as handwashing (NHS 
2021) [75]. There is some evidence that this has damaged public understanding of 
responsible behaviour. For instance, a February 2021 poll of 2,331 adults found that 
while most people saw the virus as primarily transmitted by air, 16% believed that 
touching infected surfaces was the primary method of transmission [76].2 Similarly, 
Dixon et al. [56], writing in July, found 85% of respondents blaming “failure to keep 
two metres apart and poor hand-washing” for viral spread.
While it is possible for many individuals to do their own research, and to find out 
for themselves about the relevance of various preventive measures, doing so takes 
time, a degree of scientific literacy, and a realization that institutional advice is mis-
leading. Thus, institutional failures of responsibility at least mitigate, and may even 
fully excuse, failures of a prima facie responsibility to take appropriate preventive 
steps such as ventilating rooms and avoiding indoor meetings.
4.2  Institutional Deficits and Their Implications for Personal Responsibility
The examples considered in Section  4.1 highlight how failures of institutional 
responsibility may diminish personal responsibility during a pandemic by reducing 
people’s ability to behave in particular ways, their epistemic access to relevant infor-
mation, or by increasing the personal costs of fulfilling responsibilities beyond a 
reasonable threshold. One might think that, given the relationship we have outlined 
between institutional and personal responsibility, this is the only direction in which 
this influence occurs.
However, institutional failure does not make a pandemic disappear. People will 
still be at considerable risk of illness and death. Depending on the extent of insti-
tutional failure, people may also be struggling financially or with access to food or 
medicines. As a result, failures of institutional responsibility may generate addi-
tional ‘slack-taking’ responsibilities for some individuals.
The idea that people might have a responsibility to pick up the slack when others 
fail to meet their own responsibilities is contested [77–79]. Before we come to these 
arguments, though, a caveat is important: even the most enthusiastic proponent of 
slack-taking during a pandemic must acknowledge that its scope is limited. Consider 
what would happen if a national government failed to meet their responsibility in 
securing sufficient vaccines for their population. It would simply not be possible for 
most individuals to contribute meaningfully, either alone or in concert, to securing a 
national vaccination supply. Thus, any slack-taking responsibility must be realistic.
However, there are various areas where it seems more reasonable to expect 
individuals to take up the slack. One such area concerns decision-making 
around personal behaviour. We have acknowledged that, for some individu-
als, poor institutional communication may weaken the responsibility for behav-
ing appropriately by weakening their access to reliable information. For many 
individual members of the public, though, the government is not the only source 
2 Ritchie does not link directly to the polling data he cites, nor is it publicly available online, but we have 
independently verified it with the polling group responsible, Comres-Savanta.
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of information. Although not as detailed as the advice received by government, 
there was a considerable level of Covid-related information available to the pub-
lic. As such, it was possible to form a view—as many did—that the UK govern-
ment’s legal restrictions, and even advice, were insufficiently cautious at various 
stages. Thus, we suggest, individual members of the public who were able to do 
so have a responsibility to form their own view of the risks involved in everyday 
behaviours, and to exercise a reasonable level of caution voluntarily. This is a 
‘slack-taking’ responsibility because it requires individuals to engage in a level 
of (i) risk-assessment and (ii) voluntary self-control that would not be necessary 
if those in institutional power met their responsibilities to control the spread of 
disease, and to communicate clearly about what is necessary.
A further instance of slack-taking is more familiar, since it also occurs outside 
of pandemics. In part due to the economic effects of lockdowns, but also in some 
cases to rising costs of childcare for parents who normally have children in school, 
many more families in the UK struggled with putting food on the table during the 
pandemic than is usual [80]. Food banks represent a failure of institutional respon-
sibility: in a wealthy country such as the UK, the government could avoid people 
going hungry. Yet this also seems a clear case where, amid failures of responsibility 
at the formal institutional level, individuals may have to accept additional personal 
responsibility. While some food banks are run by civil society organisations which 
can themselves be assimilated into the category of ‘institution’, many others during 
the COVID-19 era were informal agreements among neighbours or informal com-
munity groups to ensure that as many people as possible avoided hunger.
In philosophical discussions of slack-taking, some object to the idea that one per-
son’s responsibilities could be affected by the failure of others to deliver on their 
responsibilities. This discussion typically differs from our case, in that it considers 
equivalently placed agents. For instance, authors imagine three adults (all of whom 
can swim) by a pool containing three drowning children. If two refuse to jump in, 
does the remaining one have a remedial responsibility to save all three? In the cases 
we are considering, on the other hand, the agents in question are very differently 
positioned. Nonetheless, we think that at least some of the existing discussion can 
shed light on our question.
In general, those who object to ‘slack-taking’ do not deny that it would be a mor-
ally good thing to do; rather, they deny that it can be described as a genuine obliga-
tion. Many who take this line of thought object that where there are shared responsi-
bilities, one’s ‘fair share’ is determined on the assumption that everyone acts as they 
should. Even when others fail to act as they should, one’s fair share does not change 
[77, p. 90]. Miller [78] takes this line in part due to an understanding of obligations 
as something which third parties can reasonably enforce.
The concept of responsibility, however, is importantly different than that of obli-
gation. Even accepting Miller’s view of obligations, we suggest that responsibili-
ties are not necessarily subject to enforcement by third parties. Rather, what seems 
central to responsibilities is that an individual can rightly be held to account (or, 
more strongly, blamed) for non-compliance. As defenders of the idea of ‘slack-tak-
ing’ note, even if there is a degree of unfairness in expecting people to do more 
than would otherwise be reasonable simply because someone else has failed to act 
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responsibly, this unfairness may be outweighed by the needs of those to whom the 
responsibility was owed in the first place [81]. See also [79, 82–84].
We also suggest that institutional failures of responsibility are a special case. 
Public institutions perform many roles, both licit and illicit. One of these roles is to 
provide mechanisms for efficiently realizing various obligations that exist somewhat 
independently of them. As Klein [85, p. 2] puts it, democratic institutions are, in 
part, “substantive mechanisms for organizing different actors, interests and groups 
in society”.3 While various state and other institutions are the most effective vehi-
cles for the realization of many responsibilities that arise during a pandemic, these 
responsibilities are ones which we all owe to each another, and which are often best 
delivered through various institutions. If these institutions sometimes fail to deliver, 
the responsibility remains, and reverts to us (collectively and individually) to solve.
There is one important lesson, however, from objections to slack-taking. We sug-
gested that institutional failures can give rise to new personal responsibilities for 
which we can be held accountable. But it would not be reasonable for representa-
tives of those very institutions which failed their responsibilities to do this account-
holding, let alone blaming individuals who in turn failed newly generated personal 
responsibilities. Rather, moral account holding must come from other similarly 
placed individuals in the community.
5  Conclusion
Responding to a pandemic is primarily an issue of collective responsibility. This 
requires establishment of norms, and incentives and disincentives including laws, 
to change human behaviour. It is the responsibility of institutions, particularly gov-
ernmental institutions, to step up to this task and execute their institutional respon-
sibilities ethically. Perhaps less obviously, it is also essential that they set the con-
ditions—by providing information, ensuring understanding, and providing tangible 
opportunity—for individuals to meet their personal obligations, both legal and ethi-
cal. Although some focus almost exclusively on institutional responsibility, personal 
responsibility does exist in a pandemic, and under some circumstances its scope 
extends beyond responsibilities set by government and other institutions. But, given 
the collective nature of a successful pandemic response, institutional responsibility 
is prior to personal responsibility. Governments need to take responsibility, admit 
failures of responsibility openly, and shift course as mistakes become clear. They 
should not engage in “victim blaming” but enable their citizens to be responsible 
agents.
3 Though as Klein [85, p. 26] notes, we should not make the mistake of seeing the state as “a neutral 
medium for implementing collective decisions”, since it is also a political entity with its own set of inter-
ests.
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